



National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
Compliance through Coordination



Croydon Resilience Forum

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES



MULTI-AGENCY CROYDON EXOTIC NOTIFIABLE ANIMAL DISEASE OUTBREAK RESPONSE PLAN

V2.3 SEPTEMBER 2018

This plan has been completed using the national template developed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ATCSO) during 2014. It has been specifically developed for local authorities in England and Wales.

This document is classified as **OFFICIAL** as it contains sensitive information and should not be made available to people who do not need to access it. Please observe this restriction when using, storing or passing on this document, or parts of it, to only those people who have a role to play in Croydon's response to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.

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Review Log

This national contingency plan template and the supporting disease annexes will be reviewed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel (NAHWP) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) on an annual basis in January of each year.

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Superseded documents	Croydon Generic Notifiable Animal Disease Plan 2010					
Key related documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LBC Communicating in an Incident Plan Great Britain and Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England LBC Corporate Emergency Response Plan LBC Recovery Management Plan 					
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Lessons incorporated into plan				
Lesson identified			Learnt during... (incl. date)	
Boroughs to review all animal disease plans and the resources they have in their borough to deal with the response stage of any incident.			Animal Disease SRRF Workshop 4th December 2013	

PART 1: STRATEGIC SECTION

Executive Summary

1. Any outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease within the UK has a significant impact on the countries' economy and its ability to trade globally, thus there is a collective need for a multi agency approach between regulators and industry alike to swiftly and effectively control any such disease outbreak.
2. Local authorities play a key role in disease control, having a statutory responsibility to enforce disease control legislation, and it is with consideration to these roles and responsibilities that this exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan template has been produced for local authorities in England and Wales. This plan has been drafted by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel¹ and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) following concerns of the changing landscape and animal health risks England and Wales are currently witnessing. With a significant reduction in animal health experience and resource available within local authorities, any failure to have up-to-date contingency plans will leave local authorities ill prepared for a disease outbreak.
3. Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are identified as high risk in accordance with the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register, as detailed in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. As such, all local authorities in England and Wales are strongly encouraged to read and adopt this contingency plan to ensure consistency across the devolved countries. It is a stark reminder that the overall costs of the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001 to the UK economy were over £8 billion², a cost that would be untenable in the present economic climate.
4. The National Panel and ACTSO gratefully acknowledge and thank the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for their financial support and the Animal and Plant Health Agency for their expert input into the production of these contingency plans. Grateful acknowledgement is additionally given to Trading Standards South East for their original contributions on which this national contingency plan is based.
5. This contingency plan template will be reviewed on an annual basis by the National Panel. Local authorities are encouraged to regularly review their own adopted plan, which will contain additional localised information, in conjunction with their Local Resilience Forum to ensure readiness and resilience.

¹ The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel consists of lead advisers on animal health drawn from local authorities plus representatives from Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland, Food Standards Agency, Rural Payments Agency, Trading Standards Institute, Chartered Institute of Environmental Health.

² Anderson Inquiry (2002) 'Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons Learned Inquiry'.



Stephanie Young

Former Chair of the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel ACTSO

Chairman



Graham Venn

Statements of Support for these Contingency Plan Templates

6. Nigel Gibbens, UK Chief Veterinary Officer

“Whilst the UK has many measures in place to prevent the entry of exotic diseases, these cannot completely eliminate the risk of disease occurring. Good planning and preparedness is vital in delivering a rapid and effective response to a disease outbreak; early interventions and effective enforcement of controls are key to minimising the overall impact of disease on businesses and the economy, both locally and nationally. Local authorities are an important element of that response. This plan is an excellent framework for authorities to produce and maintain their individual contingency and response plans.”

7. Graham Venn, Chairman, ACTSO

“ACTSO strongly encourages all local authorities to adopt and personalise these contingency templates to ensure a quality and consistent state of resilience against exotic notifiable animal disease. All parties involved in responding to a disease outbreak need to be prepared to react in a fast and co-ordinated manner to prevent the spread of disease and limit the negative economic impacts of an outbreak. These contingency plans present an opportunity for a united response amongst local authorities and also between local and central government.”

Introduction

Aim of this Contingency Plan

1. This contingency plan provides specific information on how and when a local authority should respond to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It aims to:
 - Ensure that local authorities understand their role during a suspect or confirmed outbreak.
 - Facilitate a timely, organised and co-ordinated multi agency response.
 - Encourage a consistent approach to contingency planning and responding to a disease outbreak across England and Wales, as encouraged by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel.

Definition of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

2. The term notifiable disease means there is a legal obligation to notify the relevant authority (the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)) if a person suspects disease. Notifiable diseases are named in Section 88 of the Animal Health Act 1981 or an Order made under the Act. A full list of current notifiable diseases and links to disease fact sheets can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/notifiable-diseases-in-animals>.
3. The term exotic refers to a disease that is not currently present in the UK e.g. foot and mouth disease. Endemic diseases are those which are already present in the UK e.g. bovine tuberculosis.
4. APHA and Defra lead on responding to any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks.
5. For information on how to respond to non-notifiable or endemic disease contact the APHA. Contact details for APHA's field services offices can be found at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening#field-services>.
6. Annex's with the following specific exotic notifiable animal disease details can be found on the [Collaboration site](#):

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Annex	Disease	Information	Main Species Affected	Last occurred in the UK
Annex A	African Horse Sickness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viral disease that can cause death or severe illness which affects horses, mules and donkeys. AHS is not directly contagious between horses, it is vector-borne, in this case spread by insects. • Exotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horses 	Never
Annex B	Avian Influenza	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly infectious viral disease affecting the respiratory, digestive and / or nervous system of many species of birds. It is one of the most important poultry diseases. • Not air-borne, except over very short distances by aerosol. It is spread by movement of infected birds or contact with respiratory secretions and in particular faeces, either directly or through contaminated objects, clothes and vehicles. • Exotic and Zoonotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poultry 	Winter 2017 / 2018
Annex C	Anthrax	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bacterial infection caused by the organism <i>Bacillus anthracis</i>. The disease occurs most often in wild and domestic animals in Asia, Africa and parts of Europe; humans are rarely infected. The organism can exist as spores that allow survival in the environment, e.g. in soil, for many years. • Zoonotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cattle and other mammals 	2015

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Annex D	African Swine Fever (ASF) and Classical Swine Fever (CSF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly contagious viral disease of pigs which is serious for animal health and for the economics of the livestock industry. It may be either acute or chronic. In its acute form the disease generally results in high morbidity and mortality. The virus can remain infective in meat from infected animals for some time. It poses a significant risk of spread of disease if illegal waste food feeding occurs. • ASF and CSF can be spread through direct contact with infected pigs, faeces, genetic material or body fluids; indirect contact via fomites such as equipment, vehicles or people who work with pigs moving between pig farms with ineffective biosecurity; pigs eating infected pig meat or meat products • Exotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pigs 	AFS: Never CFS: 2000
Annex E	Bluetounge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is characterised by changes to the mucous linings of the mouth and nose and the coronary band of the foot. The disease is caused by a virus spread by certain types of biting midges. Bluetongue disease is present when it is confirmed by laboratory tests that the Bluetongue virus (BTV) is circulating in an area (moved from animal to animal via the midge). Bluetongue does not affect humans. • Exotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affects all ruminants, including sheep, cattle, deer, goats and camelids (camels, llamas, alpacas, guanaco and vicuña). It does not affect horses or pigs. 	2007
Annex F	Foot and Mouth Disease	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly infectious, notifiable vesicular disease • Affected animals have a high fever, which is followed by the development of blisters mainly in the mouth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats etc.) and pigs, other 	2007

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		<p>and on the feet.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exotic type disease 	<p>farmed cloven-hoofed mammals and wild ruminants</p>	
Annex G	Glanders and Farcy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serious bacterial disease of the respiratory tract and skin • 2 forms of the disease, it is called 'Glanders' when the principal lesions are seen in the nostrils, submaxillary glands and lung and 'Farcy' when located on the surface of limbs or body. • Humans can be infected from affected horses by inoculation through a wound. If untreated the mortality rate in humans can be as high as 95%. • Exotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horses 	1928
Annex H	Rabies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viral disease of the central nervous system • Humans can contract Rabies if they are bitten, scratched or licked on mucous membranes or broken skin by an infected animal • Effective treatment after a bite from an infected animal is available but must be started as soon as possible after the bite to stop the disease developing. • Once clinical signs develop, Rabies is invariably fatal and there is no known cure. • Signs of the disease include paralysis and aggression, leading to a painful death. It may take several months, or longer, after infection for the disease to develop and clinical signs to appear. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dogs and other mammals 	1922

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exotic and Zoonotic type disease 		
Annex I	West Nile Virus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viral infection of birds, horses and humans, that can cause meningo-encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) or meningitis (inflammation of the lining of the brain and spinal cord). The disease is spread by the bite of an infected vector, in this case a mosquito, usually Culex species. • A small proportion of human cases (less than 1%) develop meningo-encephalitis which produces nervous signs and may be fatal, but most cases of WNV are not serious and many people have no symptoms or mild flu-like symptoms • Exotic and Zoonotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horses • Birds 	Never
Annex J	Equine Infections Anaemia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Also known by horsemen as swamp fever, is a horse disease caused by a retrovirus and transmitted by biting insects, usually horseflies. • Exotic type disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horses 	2012
Annex K	Newcastle Disease	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infection of poultry or other captive birds caused by any avian strain of the paramyxovirus (APMV-1) with an intracerebral pathogenicity index in day-old chicks greater than 0.7. Many species of birds, including poultry, wild and pet birds, can be affected. The disease is found worldwide and there are frequent sporadic outbreaks. • Humans aren't normally affected, but people in direct contact with infected birds may develop a very short- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poultry 	2006

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		term eye infection, which passes without treatment. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exotic type disease		
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London Risk Register

7. Figure 1 below shows the entry included in the London Risk Register for both zoonotic and non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases. Both have been rated as medium likelihood resulting in a low impact.

LONDON RESILIENCE

3.8 Animal Diseases / Animal Health Incidents						
HL 26 a	Non-zoonotic Notifiable animal diseases (Local Authorities)	Disease introduced into a predominantly sheep area and infected animals sold at market or moved to other premises before disease is detected resulting in widely dispersed multiple outbreaks. Assessment based on the need to cull and dispose up to 4 million animals with up to 900 infected premises across UK. Movement of all susceptible livestock prohibited unless licensed. Economic and reputational losses to the agriculture and food chain industry. Loss of disease free status resulting in EU and third country import bans on livestock and livestock products from susceptible animals.	3	2	Animal Health Act 1981 Animal Health Act 2002 Other secondary legislation and EU directives National disease control strategies	May 2017
			Medium			May 2019
HL 26 b	Zoonotic Notifiable animal diseases (Local Authorities)	The most significant disease in this category is Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. The major outbreak scenario is of much greater scale than that experienced in any of the recent outbreaks of avian influenza in the UK, where the disease has been contained and has been limited to one or two infected premises plus associated contact premises. Need to cull and dispose of up to 30 million poultry across UK. Loss of disease free status resulting in EU and third country import bans on poultry, captive birds and poultry products. Disruption to communities, local economies, tourism and the environment. Economic impacts for a major outbreak assessed at £60 million.	3	2	Animal Health Act 1981 Animal Health Act 2002 Other secondary legislation and EU directives National disease control strategies	May 2017
			Medium			May 2019

Fig 1: London Risk Register, Feb 2018

7.1 Croydon Council Risk Register

Although the impact has been rated as “Medium” for London regionally, Croydon, as an outer London borough border a large county which has a large amount of green space and farmland in close proximity. Therefore, the impact may be higher for Croydon during an animal disease outbreak.

In addition to this increased risk for the borough, Croydon Council has identified that it does not have a sufficient in-house animal health function to deal with an animal disease outbreak. As a result, a risk entry was created on the council’s risk register.

Risk Register

Risk Ref	Risk Scenario		Assigned To	Existing Controls	Current Risk Rating			Future Controls	Future Risk Rating		
	Risk	Impact			Impact	L'hood	Total		Impact	L'hood	Total
PLSTR0019	<p>Failure to ensure that the Council is prepared and able to respond to an outbreak of an animal infectious disease (such as Rabies / Avian Influenza) requiring an emergency action plan to be instigated.</p> <p>(Risk reviewed and accepted at DMT 24/04/2018).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human contact / Infection. Inability to enact Public Health statutory requirements. - Unable to contain and control spread of infection (containment / Isolation areas). - Employee protection / safeguarding protocols. - Reputational damage. - Legislative action. - Financial loss. - Management and information control / dissemination. - Resource requirement to manage circumstances of outbreak. 	Goddard, Michael	<p>Action plan co-ordinated with DEFRA & Corporation of London.</p> <p>Appropriate communications methods for general public and staff.</p> <p>Business Continuity plans in place.</p> <p>Contractual obligation / control measures with Corporation of London.</p> <p>Designated Isolation locations.</p> <p>Regular updates ACTSO received and communications initiated where necessary.</p> <p>Secure sites for destruction and burial / cremation of infected animals.</p> <p>Staff immunisation programme (where appropriate).</p>	3	3	9	<p>Attendance of Corporation of London scheduled meetings as notified.</p> <p>LBC Disease Outbreak Plan currently being reviewed and updated.</p>	2	3	6

National Contingency Plans available for guidance:

- Great Britain and Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69525/pb13714-animal-disease-plan-gbni-120228.pdf
- Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2016>

Local Authority Key Responsibilities

1. Overall accountability for dealing with any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak is the responsibility of the relevant Government department (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra)) and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). Throughout this response process, these agencies will uphold a strong focus on confidentiality and will only share information on a need-to-know basis at the point that local authorities or other multi agency partners are required to react. Local authorities will be expected to work with the relevant Resilience and Operational Manager (ROM) and the Readiness and Resilience Manager (RRM) from their APHA field services office. **The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should not undertake additional tasks and responsibilities in relation to the operational response to a disease situation without the APHA's prior knowledge and instruction.**
2. A key element of any animal disease control strategy is the use of declarations or declaratory orders which are issued by the Secretary of State. Declarations or declaratory orders introduce controls such as movement restrictions and possible footpath closures. It is the role of the LAAHF to enforce the rules within such orders and it is vital that they are quickly received and understood. During the suspicion phase of certain diseases, a temporary control zone may be declared around any premises under suspicion. If disease is confirmed, APHA are likely to impose a protection zone surrounded by a larger surveillance zone. Controls within the protection zone are more stringent than those within the surveillance zone to reflect the increased risk of transmission of disease. The distance of these zones can vary and local authorities should always seek advice from APHA, although typically a protection zone can be 3km in radius around infected premises and a surveillance zone 10km in radius around infected premises.
3. Some of the key responsibilities for local authorities in responding to a disease outbreak are:
 - a) The enforcement of animal disease control rules made under the European Communities Act 1972 and the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the 2002 Act). This role is focused on preventing the spread of disease, in conjunction with the APHA. These controls aim to limit the effect on human and animal activities by undertaking tasks such as providing advice on disease control measures, serving restriction notices and undertaking roadside mobile vehicle checks in conjunction with the Police. All of the above tasks should be done at speed, which in practice will require 24/7 cover.
 - b) To work with Public Health England to protect public health.
 - c) To promote and maintain good biosecurity measures and provide guidance on this when required. Biosecurity should be considered at all times, but

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becomes a heightened importance during and immediately after an outbreak to prevent spread or reoccurrence of disease.
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals>

- d) To consider the local risks and priorities when responding to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.
- e) To keep accurate records of all checks completed, decisions made and actions taken to control an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. This information will be needed for any subsequent inquiries and the European Union (EU) auditing process after an outbreak which is crucial to ensure the UK successfully receives the maximum levels of available reimbursement from the EU.

Local Authority roles and responsibilities in specific animal disease outbreaks

	African Horse Sickness	Avian Influenza	Anthrax	ASF and CSF	Bluetongue	Foot & Mouth Disease	Glanders and Farcy	Rabies	West Nile Virus	Equine Infectious Anaemia	Newcastle Disease
Enforcement of Animal Health & Welfare Legislation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Enforce Animal Movement Restrictions	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Enforce cat and dog controls								X			
Contribute to issuing of Notices and Movement Licenses if required	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Identify premises affected or potentially affected	X	X		X			X		X	X	
Work with PHE to understand the risk posed to human health								X			
Assist the APHA to identify and maintain lists of poultry keepers		X									
Identify travellers / travellers sites with horses	X						X		X	X	
Identify local risks	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Support APHA in capturing and detention of feral horses	X									X	
Dissemination of guidance and information	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Communication with local community affected	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			
Stand down and Recovery	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	
Road and warning signage		X		X		X		X			X
Biosecurity (and separation from wild birds)		X			X						
Intelligence Gathering		X			X						X
Enforcement of meat controls		X		X							X
Monitor cleansing and disinfectant requirements		X		X		X	X	X	X		X
Deal with abandoned birds		X									

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	African Horse Sickness	Avian Influenza	Anthrax	ASF and CSF	Bluetongue	Foot & Mouth Disease	Glanders and Farcy	Rabies	West Nile Virus	Equine Infectious Anaemia	Newcastle Disease
Disposal of carcasses			X				X		X		
Restrictions in relation to feral pigs				X							
Capture and detain stray animals						X		X			
Trace animals and or animal products						X		X			
Contribution to vaccination plan								X			

Multi Agency Response (Croydon Resilience Forum)

When an outbreak is confirmed, a London Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) will be convened to support communities to rebuild, restore and rehabilitate following an emergency. In addition to this, a London Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be set up to guide the response to the wider impacts of the outbreak. A London Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) may be established to ensure that response issues can be addressed jointly, particularly where multiple local authorities are affected. If a SCG / TCG are established they will usually hand over to the RCG when the incident is contained and there is no immediate risk of escalation.

National Partners Roles & Responsibilities

1. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra)

Defra are the government leads for preparing for and managing an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak in England and Wales respectively. They are responsible for establishing the structures and policies required to eradicate disease as outlined in their national contingency plans, which should be considered alongside this document. A series of control strategies accompany these national contingency plans for certain diseases including Foot and Mouth Disease and Rabies:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-animal-and-plant-health/2010-to-2015-government-policy-animal-and-plant-health#appendix-3-controlling-animal-disease>.

2. Animal and Plant Health Agency

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) is an Executive Agency acting on behalf of Defra and the devolved Governments to lead the response to eradicate any outbreaks of exotic notifiable animal disease at a national and local level. The APHA has significant input into decisions made at a strategic level and it plays a fundamental role in ensuring effective communication occurs across Central Government and delivery partners, including the co-ordination of the tactical level response at the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC).

At a local operational level APHA has responsibility for leading the local disease operation which includes managing the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and any Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) which will be located as close as

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possible to the infected premise(s). Other responsibilities include: inspection, sampling and disease identification; communication with local stakeholders and operational partners to ensure they are aware of their responsibilities in a disease situation; leading on identifying tracing of the disease source(s) and spread; co-ordinating the serving of notices and movement licences; working with delivery partners to organise enforcement activities.

3. Public Health England

During an outbreak Public Health England (PHE) assess the impact of zoonotic disease on public health and provide health protection expertise and advice to the public, NHS professionals, directors of public health in local authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The term zoonotic means a disease that can be transmitted from animals to humans. (Not all exotic notifiable animal diseases are zoonotic.)

PHE would be involved in the disease response at a very early stage and, where appropriate, they would attend the NDCC at a national level and the LDCC at a local level. If the exotic disease has zoonotic potential, PHE would stand up its internal incident control structures to coordinate human health risk assessments. PHE have the lead responsibility for public health response and depending on the novelty and magnitude of threat, would provide specialist advice to responding agencies in order to minimise impacts on human health. This may involve the provision of scientific, laboratory and epidemiological support.

4. Food Standards Agency

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) work with Defra and APHA during a suspect or confirmed outbreak to provide relevant support with regards to food safety and hygiene and protecting the overall farm to fork production process. In practice this would involve attendance at the NDCC to provide input on any potential risks to consumers as a result of the suspect or confirmed outbreak. At an operational level, FSA staff may be involved in the initial identification of suspicion of exotic notifiable animal disease during routine ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections. Any concerns would immediately be referred to the APHA.

For diseases which may pass to other animals from disease contaminated meat or animal by-products, the FSA are required to designate slaughterhouses and as necessary cutting plants etc. to handle restricted meat and implement enhanced checks. Where meat plants are under the control of local authorities, local authorities may need to approve those processing plants which have elected to put in place the necessary controls to be designated as treatment centres.

5. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) Resilience Team and the Chair of the relevant LRF will be notified of a suspect or confirmed outbreak by APHA. Dependent on the situation this is likely to trigger a local multi agency response via the LRF as briefly summarised at the start of this

chapter. MHCLG would attend the NDCC and the relevant LRF would attend the LDCC.

6. Environment Agency

During an outbreak the Environment Agency (EA) focus on ensuring the environmental impacts of an outbreak are managed. The EA provide expert advice and have a regulatory role for certain waste management and disposal activities, including disposal of carcasses, animal by-products, manures and washwaters. The EA provide advice on pollution prevention measures (for example in relation to the use of disinfectants and biocides for biosecurity and cleansing and disinfection purposes) and monitor the environmental impacts of an outbreak.

7. Local Government Association

The Local Government Association (LGA) would be responsible for leading the local government media response at a national level, supporting council media teams, producing briefing materials for local authorities and Councillors, and for representing local authorities at Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meetings and NDCC meetings. If the LGA are not in attendance at NDCC meetings, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) would represent local authorities on their behalf.

During an outbreak the communications teams of affected local authorities should liaise closely with the LGA communications team. The LGA would take a proactive role in high profile outbreaks to help protect the reputation of individual councils, and local government as a whole.

8. Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers

In an outbreak situation ACTSO support Defra / APHA with the dissemination of key operational information to animal health and welfare officers in local authorities in England and Wales. ACTSO also provide policy and secretariat support to the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel.

Regional / Local Partners Roles & Responsibilities

1. Animal and Plant Health Agency (Field Services Office)

At a local level, the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are encouraged to maintain a good relationship with their APHA field services office, in particular the Resilience and Operational Managers (ROMs) and Readiness and Resilience Managers (RRMs). Contact details for the APHA field services offices can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening#field-services>. It is also advisable

that key LAAHF staff are signed up to receive information alerts from APHA's subscription service.

2. Public Health England

The Local Health Protection Teams of PHE and the local authority's Director of Public Health would work closely with the APHA via the LDCC to address the public health needs involved in responding to a disease outbreak. They would also input into the CRF's response.

3. Croydon Resilience Forum (CRF)

As detailed in Defra's national contingency plan "the LAAHF provides an informed link between the APHA, local authorities and the local resilience forums". Croydon Resilience Forum partner agencies may have a role to play during an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak, such as the Metropolitan Police Service assisting with management of cordons. Croydon Council's Resilience Team will notify the CRF and may hold a teleconference, as detailed in the notification process.

4. Neighbouring local authorities

Local authorities may wish to consider creating cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighbouring authorities to enable additional staff to be drafted in during an outbreak situation. Local authority officers do not have automatic jurisdiction in other boroughs / counties so provision may be required to swear in officers, if required. An example memorandum of understanding for this type of agreement can be found in [Appendix F](#).

5. City of London Corporation (CoL)

City of London undertake some of the animal health functions within Croydon:

- CoL undertake a set number of inspections for Croydon per year.
- CoL assist Croydon when reacting to complaints that need a technical input.
- CoL provide advice and assistance.
- CoL maintain a register of animal keepers and make Croydon's statutory returns, ie. Re-enforcement activity.
- CoL deal with illegal animal landings – e.g. dogs brought in to the country without going through customs/quarantine etc.
- The CoL officers are authorised (by Croydon's Chief Exec.) to undertake enforcement action in the borough.

Contact details for City of London Corporation can be found in [Appendix A](#).

Command Structures and Communications in an Outbreak

Key events when an outbreak situation arises

Detailed information on the alert processes for suspicion of disease and command structures, if disease is confirmed, are available in Defra's national contingency plans. Some of the key points discussed in these documents are summarised below:

Phase	Lead	Activities
Suspicion of disease	APHA	There is a legal duty on any person who suspects that an animal may have a notifiable disease to report their suspicion to the Secretary of State via the APHA. If the report leads APHA to suspect disease may be present, an investigation will be carried out by a Veterinary Inspector and the APHA Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit (VENDU) will be informed that an investigation is underway.
Premises placed under restriction	APHA	The premises where disease is suspected may be placed under restrictions preventing any movement on or off the site. If disease cannot be ruled out by the investigating vet, samples may be taken for laboratory testing. At this stage disease could be confirmed based on clinical grounds, although this is only likely to happen if there is an ongoing outbreak and a known epidemiological link to confirmed disease. In theory, local authorities should be informed about the concern of potential disease at the point when samples are taken, however, these timelines may vary dependent on the judgement of the local APHA office and the circumstances of each individual situation.
Notification within Central Government	VENDU APHA	VENDU is responsible for initially notifying various officials if there is sufficient concern about a suspicion of disease. This will include the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for all devolved administrations, Government officials and APHA senior management. Following this notification, a series of case conferences may be held to

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	<p>discuss the emerging issues and to consider whether an amber teleconference should be triggered by the CVO UK's office. A standard alert system is used to indicate the disease status:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • White – disease is not present or suspected in the UK. • Black – risk of disease is higher than normal e.g. disease may be suspected or confirmed in a nearby EU member state. • Amber – strong suspicion of the presence of disease on a particular premises based on clinical picture, following a veterinary investigation. • Red – disease confirmed or that an operational response has been initiated.
<p align="center">Amber Teleconference</p> <p align="center">CVO UK</p>	<p>If suspicion of disease is strong and its presence cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds, an amber alert teleconference will be held to assess the risk of the situation and agree on the next steps required to respond to the situation. This is chaired by the CVO UK. The relevant CVO may decide to confirm disease (raising the alert from amber to red) or specify what further evidence, such as test results, would be needed. If a veterinary risk assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting for laboratory test results, the CVO may take the decision to move to red alert without waiting for those results which could result in a pre-emptive cull of affected animals (slaughter on suspicion).</p>
<p align="center">Disease Confirmation</p> <p align="center">Defra APHA CVO UK</p>	<p>If disease is confirmed by positive laboratory test results, or the relevant CVO makes a decision to confirm disease at the amber teleconference stage, command and control structures are put in place to direct and co-ordinate the disease control response. The lead agencies for co-ordinating this response are Defra and APHA.</p>

Response Levels

The response levels for reacting to exotic notifiable animal disease are defined as:

Strategic Direction and Commissioning Level	The national government response is co-ordinated through strategic direction from Ministers and senior officials. In addition, and depending on the outbreak COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) may be convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
Tactical Level	The National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) is led by the CVO UK.
Operational Level	Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) is led by APHA.

During an outbreak, the Local Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) command structures of the CRF will primarily liaise and be briefed by the LDCC. If a disease is zoonotic close liaison would also take place with Public Health England (PHE).

The NDCC and the LDCC operate around a set battle rhythm which is outlined in the table below for England. This provides a structure for the management of the outbreak to enable a co-ordinated multi agency response, although a battle rhythm would be proportionate dependent on the disease and the perceived level of risk i.e. a decision may be made to operate a more or less condensed version.

At the commencement of an outbreak, APHA's Corporate External Communications Liaison Manager will make contact with the **affected local authority's communications team, who will be involved in the daily communications meeting at 9.00am, as detailed in the table below (highlighted green).**

Battle Rhythm from Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	Strategic	Daily Strategic Stock take
	Operational	Daily Management and Communications Meeting
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting – APHA / Defra brief all parties involved
1000 – 1100	Strategic	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) – NSC (THRC)

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1130 – 1200	Strategic	Defra Media Briefing
	Operational	Media Briefing
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
1400 – 1430	Tactical / Operational	LDCC Management Teleconference
1500 – 1600	Strategic	NSC (THRC)
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
Ad-hoc	Strategic	Animal Disease Policy Group
	Tactical	National Experts Group
	Operational	Disease Emergency Response Committee (DERC)
2100 approx.	NDCC Management Information and Reports Team	Daily report compiled and circulated – to provide a comprehensive situation report on all aspects

LBC will be expected to be involved with the Tactical NDCC and Operational LDCC meetings highlighted above (yellow).

During an outbreak ACTSO will disseminate relevant messages from Defra to all local authorities in England and Wales, as agreed at amber teleconferences, communication meetings, and NDCC bird-table meetings. In addition, the Defra website will be a key source of information for accessing up-to-date information.

Local Authority Communications

The local authority communications strategy will be informed by Croydon Council's Communicating in an Incident Plan alongside directives from Defra and Public Health England.

Releasing information to the public

1. During an outbreak affected local authorities will be expected to release warning and informing communications. The upmost care must be taken when releasing any written or verbal information into the public domain. Local authorities will need to ensure that communications to the media and public follow the national briefing line but also include local emphasis. **Local authorities should only release specific information about the disease outbreak to the public which has already been publicised on the Defra website.**
2. Whilst media reports need to be honest, caution must be exercised to prevent the spread of scaremongering stories that could be harmful to the agricultural industry and its recovery in terms of export trade and public confidence. That said, local authorities should aim to be pro-active with releasing information updates to prevent the release of misleading or unhelpful stories. This should be done in liaison with Defra press office and may involve setting up a media briefing room close to the source of an outbreak. Ideally representatives from the press

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team of the local authority, Defra, APHA and the police should be involved at press conferences. Additionally social media will be an important tool in communicating with the public.

3. It will be advisable for communications teams in the affected authorities to liaise closely with the Local Government Association (LGA) communications team who can provide advice and support, as well as APHA's press office.

Scaling down after a suspect or confirmed incident

4. At a national level stand down procedures only commence upon notification from Defra and APHA, and in tandem with the official stand down of the national animal disease contingency plan. This will only be considered once there has been an acceptable period after the last disease confirmation, and upon consideration of veterinary opinion.

Health and Safety

1. All staff must promote and practice effective biosecurity measures to minimise the risk of further disease spread or reoccurrence. Further information on biosecurity can be found at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals>
2. During an outbreak the risks will vary dependent on the type of disease. Further information on health and safety can be found in the [disease annexes](#) that support this contingency plan, for example the provision of precautionary vaccinations during a rabies outbreak.

PART 2: OPERATIONAL SECTION

Preparing for an Outbreak

- Following activation of this contingency plan, a local authority should consider its available resources when planning a short, medium and long term response to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Local authorities are a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and this may have already been considered through a local authority's business continuity management arrangements.
- Defra and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) categorise outbreaks as follows:

Category	Infected Premises (IPs)	Expected Duration	Political Factors
1 – Single Disease	1	< 2 months	Little political, public or media interest
2 – Single Disease	> 1 IPs within the same control zone, close geographic area or with clear business links between IPs.	< 6 months	Greater political, public and or media interest at the initial announcements, but reduces quickly
3 – Two concurrent diseases	> 20 IPs with a geographic spread and some business links between IPs.	6 – 12 months	Greater political, public and or media interest at the initial announcements and could involve and external enquiry
Category 4 – Three or more concurrent diseases	> 20 IPs with geographic spread and few business links between IPs or not within the same company structure.	> 12 months	Likely to involve one or more external inquiries. High level of sustained political (COBR involvement), public and or media interest.

Staff Resources

3. Under Section 52 of the Animal Health Act 1981 a local authority can appoint as many inspectors and other officers as it believes is necessary for the execution and enforcement of this Act. As part of the contingency planning process, **Croydon Council** has the following staff roles that can potentially be available to respond:

Croydon Staff Resource Log

Roles	Croydon Staff	Other LA	Partner Agencies
Trained LA Inspectors <i>With enforcement powers</i>	No trained LA inspectors within Croydon Council	n/a	2x trained inspectors through CoL agreement
Untrained LA Inspectors <i>No enforcement powers</i>	1x dog warden		
Other field staff <i>No enforcement powers</i>	n/a		
Admin Support	Emergency Response Volunteers (potential need for a BECC* for incident coordination)		

*Borough Emergency Control Centre

Croydon Animal Premises

Details and maps of animal premises within London Borough of Croydon can be found in [Appendix H on SharePoint](#). **Please note: this Appendix is restricted as it details registered keeper's addresses.**

Notification and Activation of this Contingency Plan


Receiving Notification of Suspect or Confirmed Disease

1. The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) regularly investigates suspect disease and such investigations should be seen as routine. For suspect cases where disease cannot be ruled out and samples are taken, APHA will contact the relevant Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) by telephone to inform them that they have placed the suspect premises under restriction. The LAAHF at Croydon Council falls under the responsibility of the Licencing Team.
2. **If the LAAHF receives information regarding a suspect case from any source other than the APHA, they should immediately contact APHA.**
3. APHA will notify the LAAHF via telephone using the pre-agreed contact numbers as detailed in the alerting flowchart overleaf. APHA will share a copy of the premises restriction notice (NDI 1 form) with a LAAHF, however, this can only be sent to a secure email account. If the disease in question is zoonotic (i.e. it can be transmitted from animals to humans) APHA will also contact Public Health England.

Activating this Contingency Plan

4. **When the LAAHF initially receives notification of a suspect or confirmed case of exotic notifiable animal disease from the APHA, the relevant Head of Service and Resilience Team must be informed immediately.** It is advisable that this plan should be activated at this stage, although this should be discussed in line with a local authority's existing internal arrangements. A decision should also be made on whether other key partners should be notified, such as London Resilience and the CRF.
5. The CRF is the principal mechanism for multi-agency cooperation in Croydon under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. To allow a measured and appropriate response to suspect exotic notifiable animal disease it is important to ensure that CRF partner agencies and any other key partners of the LAAHF are alerted in line with pre-agreed triggers. The principles of an initial notification process have been demonstrated in the flowchart below.

The Initial Notification Process



Responding to an Outbreak

Suggested Tasks - Suspicion Stage

	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
1	Consider what resources are required to respond to the outbreak. Consider opening a BECC		
2	Take direction from the APHA on expected timescales for laboratory results and the locations of the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC). Whilst planning, remember the relevant Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) has the option to approve slaughter on suspicion ahead of laboratory test results.		
3	Assess and map potential disease control zones.		
4	Confirm what relevant enforcement controls may be required in control zones, including any temporary control zones e.g. footpath and road closures.		
5	Liaise with police on potential resource for mobile roadside vehicle checks. If disease is confirmed it is vital to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.		
6	Update the profile of the animal premises in the local area and identify which businesses are likely to be affected. (See Table 3 in Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak.)		
7	Ensure data records on livestock premises and movements are up-to-date.		
8	Undertake a quick equipment stock check or order equipment needed. (see Appendix D).		
9	Establish horizon scanning procedures to identify potential operational / logistical problems and appropriate solutions.		
10	Check contact numbers for key multi agency partners (see Appendix A).		
11	Consider the use of Everbridge for communicating with staff out of hours, if disease is confirmed.		
12	Review any health and safety considerations specific to the potential disease. Refer to the disease annexes for more information and if the disease is zoonotic contact the local Public Health		

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	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
	England centre for guidance.		
13	Consider alerting neighbouring boroughs if appropriate.		
14	Consider placing all potential guidance, law and forms in one location to allow easy access if confirmed. (SharePoint emergency planning collaboration site or Resilience Direct)		
15	Consider creating or obtaining a disease summary document to relay important information to the local community. An example of this can be found in Appendix E and further examples are available on the Knowledge Hub and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on Resilience Direct.		
16	Ensure data sharing agreements are available with APHA e.g. to allow local authorities to access information from the National Poultry Register.		
17	If a suspect outbreak is negated, undertake a lessons learnt exercise to review what improvements could be made to responding to an outbreak in the future.		

Suggested Tasks – Confirmed Disease

Following notification of a confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak the following tasks should be considered:

1. Resources

	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
1	Establish staff numbers required to effectively enforce disease control legislation. Identify staff availability including total staff numbers available for enforcement, licensing and advice (refer to Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak). Ensure officer authorisations are up-to-date and appropriate for all tasks including the serving of notices where required.		
2	Establish roles within the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams and delegate tasks. This is likely to involve interaction with a number of internal departments (Trading Standards, Corporate Resilience, Communications, Public Health, Highways, Elected Members, HR, Finance, Social Services, Environmental Health services and possibly neighbouring local authorities if an inter authority working arrangement is in place).		
3	Ensure Health and Safety officers are contacted and appropriate risk assessments are in place for disease control, including relevant COSHH assessments and infection control policies for zoonotic disease risks. If the disease is zoonotic contact the local Public Health England. Relevant training must be given to staff as needed.		
4	Ensure appropriate quantities and types of personal protection equipment is available for all staff and that Defra approved disinfectant is available for the type of disease. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defra-approved-disinfectant-when-and-how-to-use-it		
5	Produce maps to mark disease boundaries for enforcement controls.		
6	Produce road and footpath signs to raise awareness of disease control measures in liaison with APHA. Refer to Appendix G for further information on outbreak signage guidance.		
7	Ensure IT and website requirements are identified,		

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	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
	and financial forecasting is completed.		

2. **Data** - Up-to-date, accurate and easily accessible data is essential for effective disease control. Ensure sufficient resource is provided to maintaining data on livestock premises, including hobbyist premises, this will be a valuable resource in identifying possible affected premises on suspicion or confirmation of disease. The LAAHF should consider the following data tasks:

	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
1	Retain a log of events, decisions made and actions taken. Ideally this log should be maintained by one person. In addition, all officers and managers are encouraged to keep their own individual logs. Capturing this information is important to demonstrate a local authority acted effectively in attempting to control disease for any subsequent inquiries. If the Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) is activated it will include a dedicated loggist role.		
2	Establish the geographical extent of the outbreak – are other local authorities affected?		
3	Keep accurate financial records of all costs associated with responding to the disease outbreak. These will be needed to claim eligible EU reimbursement / Bellwin funding (if applicable) for some costs associated with responding to the outbreak. Any such information on funding will be made available by Defra or the Local Government Association at an appropriate time.		

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3. **Prevention of spread of disease** - A well co-ordinated, clearly communicated and timely multi agency approach is required for effective control of disease. Direction is given by the APHA for disease control and the local authority must appoint sufficient staff, as they feel appropriate, to enforce disease control requirements. As part of this enforcement role the LAAHF should consider the following tasks, alongside the Resilience Team and Croydon Resilience Forum's command and control structure.

	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
1	Agree the key objectives for disease control and enforce restrictions and movement controls in partnership with APHA and the police.		
2	Ensure all staff and operational managers have awareness of relevant legislation and local authority powers.		
3	Ensure staff are aware of health and safety requirements and have relevant PPE.		
4	Confirm what enforcement controls may be required in the control zones with APHA, including any temporary control zones.		
5	Undertake mobile roadside vehicle checks, in conjunction with the police. If disease is confirmed it is vital to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.		
7	Be prepared to close footpaths and roads around infected premises and other suspected premises upon request by the APHA. Refer to Appendix G for further guidance.		
8	Monitor cleansing and disinfection (C&D) requirements and serve notices where necessary. Ensure pollution prevention controls are in place when meeting C&D and biosecurity requirements, in liaison with the local authority waste disposal team. Defra, APHA and the Environment Agency have produced joint guidance on the disposal of disinfectant washwater from C&D activities (this is available on the Knowledge Hub). Also consider the preferred routes for vehicles taking stock to renderers.		
9	Identify livestock holdings requests and assist in the identification of otherwise unknown livestock holdings. Dependent on the type of disease and the type of animals affected, this may include door to door enquiries. Additionally consider any unique geographic characteristics which may influence the response e.g. large areas of wetland, areas of intensive agriculture.		

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4. **Communications** - Timely and accurate communication is essential when responding to an outbreak situation and it is paramount to handle communications carefully.

	Action	Time / Date Completed	Initials
1	Ensure timely, targeted and appropriate updates are provided to the LAAHF team (in the office and out in the field), elected members, other internal departments, neighbouring local authorities (if applicable) and other key partners (CRF).		
2	Provide appropriate representation at the Croydon's gold and silver meetings.		
3	Set up clear communication channels with APHA, this will normally be done via attendance at LDCC meetings (in person or via teleconferencing). Local authorities normally provide one permanent representative at LDCC. If a control zone covers multiple local authority borders or there are infected premises in multiple local authorities, it is advisable that one local authority takes the lead on this liaison.		
4	Ensure an effective first point of contact is in place to handle enquiries and updates from partners, the farming community and the public. Brief the contact centre on signposting / information		
5	Communications need to be handled carefully and must be in line with national guidance as issued by, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) and Local Government Association (LGA). Liaison should also be made with the multi-agency strategic (gold) communications group covering the CRF area, which may be considered the appropriate channel to issue locally co-ordinated and agreed messages to the public and media.		
7	Consider if there is a need to set up a media briefing room close to the source of the outbreak. This can be helpful in preventing the media generating misleading stories about the outbreak.		
8	Ensure relevant staff are signed up to receive animal disease information alerts from the APHA Subscription Service. http://animalhealth.system-message.co.uk/AH_subscribe_index.php		

Appendix A: Contact Lists

Please ensure the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have up-to-date contact information for the Lead Animal Health Officer and out of hours contact arrangements. All contact lists should be reviewed on an annual basis.

1) Local Authority Out of Hours Emergency Contact Procedures

This information has been redacted.

2) Local Authority Internal Contact List

This information has been redacted.

3) External Local / Regional Partners

This information has been redacted.

4) External National Partners

This information has been redacted.

Appendix B: Glossary of Terms

ACTSO	Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers
AH&W	Animal Health and Welfare
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AI	Avian Influenza
APHA	Animal and Plant Health Agency (formally Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency)
ASF	African Swine Fever
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
COSHH	Control Of Substances Hazardous to Health
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DARDNI	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland
MHCLG	Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (England)
EA	Environment Agency
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FSA	Food Standards Agency
GIS	Geographic Information Services
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IP	Infected Premise
LA	Local Authority
LAAHF	Local Authority Animal Health Function
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LGA	Local Government Association
Livestock	All animals (including poultry) susceptible to exotic notifiable disease
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
NAHWP	National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NFU	National Farmers Union
NHS	National Health Service
NSC (THRC)	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)
OIE	Office International des Epizooties (World Organisation for Animal Health)
OV	Official Veterinarian
PHE	Public Health England

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PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
PZ	Protection Zone
RCG	Recovery Co-ordinating Group
RFM	Regional Field Manager, APHA
ROM	Resilience and Operational Manager, APHA
RPE	Respiratory Protective Equipment
RRM	Readiness and Resilience Manager, APHA
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SoS	Secretary of State
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
SZ	Surveillance Zone
TCG	Tactical Co-ordinating Group
TCZ	Temporary Control Zone
TSSE	Trading Standards South East
VENDU	Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit, part of APHA
VI	Veterinary Inspector
WNV	West Nile Virus

Appendix C: Command Structures in Great Britain

This information has been redacted.

Appendix D: Suggested Equipment List

An indicative guide to the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak. Equipment needs will vary dependent on the type of disease, further information on this is available in the relevant disease annex.

Equipment Item	Amount in stock	Location	Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation of equipment <i>Include phone and email</i>	Supplier details for ordering extra equipment <i>Include contact details and website where appropriate</i>
Personal Protective Equipment				
Steel toe capped wellington boots or waders	3 pairs	Food and Safety Team		https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/
Overalls (preferably disposable)	10	Food and Safety Team		https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/
Breathable waterproof suit or coat and leggings				
Disposable gloves	100	Food and Safety Team		https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/
Hi-visibility jackets or vests	10	Food and Safety Team		https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/
Eye protection (goggles or visor)				https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/
Vinyl gloves				https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/

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Equipment Item	Amount in stock	Location	Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation of equipment <i>Include phone and email</i>	Supplier details for ordering extra equipment <i>Include contact details and website where appropriate</i>
Safety helmet				
Dust masks				
Respirators				
First aid kit				https://www.foodsafetydirect.co.uk/

Appendix E: Cross Border Warrants - Memorandum of Understanding

Example provided by the Central England Trading Standards Authorities partnership (CEnTSA).

CEnTSA Animal Health Cross Border Warrants Memorandum of Understanding

Parties

1. The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU') are the members of the Central England Trading Standards Authorities partnership (CEnTSA), namely:
 - (Insert authority names)

Purpose of agreement

2. The risk of a contagious animal disease outbreak has increased over recent years, whilst resources available in individual authorities have declined.
3. To ensure that CEnTSA authorities can respond robustly to an outbreak, this agreement allows for officers within the region to be authorised by each authority, enabling additional resources to be deployed quickly in the first days of an outbreak.

Definitions

4. 'Requesting Authority' – The authority where the suspected or confirmed outbreak is located.
5. 'Responding authority' – Name for an authority that is providing officer support to the requesting authority.
6. 'Authorised Officer' – An officer listed in Schedule 2.
7. 'APHA' – Animal and Plant Health Agency
8. 'CEnTSA Authority' – Partners listed in section 1.

Arrangements

Authorisation

9. Each CEnTSA authority shall authorise the individual officers listed in schedule 2 to enforce the legislation listed in schedule 1 on behalf of

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their authority in the event of AHPA issuing a notification that a confirmed or suspected animal disease outbreak has occurred.

PPE & Competence

10. Each CEnTSA authority shall ensure that the officers listed in Schedule 2 are competent in Animal Health enforcement.
11. The requesting authority shall ensure that suitable personal protective equipment is provided to officers, unless they already have appropriate attire with them.

Activation

12. Authorised officers can only act on behalf of a requesting authority if the AHPA has issued a notification that a confirmed or suspected animal disease outbreak has occurred.
13. The requesting authority head of service or nominated duty manager must request assistance via their counterpart in a responding authority, this may be facilitated by the CEnTSA regional co-ordinator.

Response

14. The responding authority head of service or nominated duty manager must decide if the authority can respond to the request or not and this decision must be communicated to the requesting authority.

Review

15. The requesting authority shall review its resource requirements after a period of five calendar days and then agree with the responding authority head of service or nominated duty manager any request to retain officers for a further period of time.

Cost recovery

16. The responding authority will continue to be responsible for employment costs (excluding overtime payments) up to a maximum of five calendar days.
17. On the sixth day onwards, the requesting authority is then liable to pay an agreed day rate per officer per day to the responding authority, the cost recovery rate will be agreed between the two parties.
18. The requesting authority shall reimburse all reasonable expenses / overtime payments incurred by officers in the performance of their duties on behalf of the requesting authority.

General

Liability

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- 19. Whilst an officer is acting on behalf of a requesting authority, that authority is liable for the employee's wellbeing and health & safety.
- 20. The requesting authority shall hold appropriate professional indemnity and public liability insurance.

Termination

- 21. The responding authority can terminate its assistance to a requesting authority by giving 12 hours' notice to that effect.
- 22. If the responding authority has an outbreak confirmed within its own area, it then only needs to give 3 hours' notice to the requesting authority.

Data Protection & FOI

- 23. All parties agree to comply with obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.
- 24. Partners agree to comply with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOI") in relation to this agreement.

Confidentiality

- 25. Partners agree to ensure any confidential information received via enforcement activity remains confidential other than for fulfilling a statutory, legal or parliamentary obligation.

Resolving Disagreements

- 26. Partners are committed to resolving any disagreements under this MoU bilaterally.

Review of the MoU

- 27. Amendments to this MoU may be made at any time by agreement between the partners.

Signatures

(Insert local authority name)	
Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:
(Insert local authority name)	

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Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:
(Insert local authority name)	
Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:

Appendix F: Outbreak Signage Guidance

Animal Disease Outbreak Signage Guidance for Local Authorities (Roads, footpaths and bridleways) October 2016

1. Local authorities have a duty in certain circumstances to erect signs to indicate animal disease control zones³ during a suspect or confirmed outbreak of some exotic notifiable animal diseases. Signage is used to raise awareness of an outbreak situation, to encourage local keepers and the public to search for further information on how an outbreak may affect them, and to identify an area/zone which is subject to animal disease movement controls. Signs may also be used to restrict access to certain land in order to prevent the risk of spreading the disease to other places. Initially a local authority's primary focus will be on road signs but there may be an additional need to consider footpaths and bridleways dependent on the location and type of disease.
2. The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have developed this guidance and a new generic animal disease outbreak sign in partnership with Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), the Department for Transport (DfT), and the National Police Chiefs' Council to encourage a consistent approach on this matter. Signage is, however, only one method of informing the local community about animal disease restrictions and the extent of control/restriction zones. Local authorities are encouraged to use additional communication methods such as leaflets, posters, the media, internet, social media and Defra's interactive map and alerts subscription service.

Planning and Deployment

3. **A Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should discuss signage with the APHA as soon as they become aware of a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.** The signing of zones is a key regulatory function and helps to fulfill our warning and informing obligations under relevant disease control legislation. As part of the multi-agency contingency planning process the LAAHF should also discuss the creation, deployment and potential storage of outbreak signage with their Emergency Planning and Highways departments.

³ Further information on control zones is available in Section 3.3 of the Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan.

4. Signs should be deployed as quickly as possible after the declaration or declaratory order imposing the control zones is made by a relevant government Minister to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.
5. It is acknowledged it may not be economically viable for individual local authorities to hold a pre-prepared store of outbreak signage, however, it is hoped that the introduction of a generic sign for all disease outbreaks will encourage the re-use of signs and/or neighboring authorities to consider establishing joint or regional stores. Local authorities are also encouraged to have an arrangement in place with a traffic sign manufacturer as part of their contingency plans.

Design and Manufacture

6. The new animal disease outbreak sign adheres to transport legislation requirements and is located in Annex 1. Under [The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016](#) No.362 animal disease can be classified as a civil emergency and a temporary traffic sign can be erected for as long as the outbreak exists in accordance with Schedule 13, Part 9.
7. Always liaise with your Highways department before ordering road signs. The DfT have provided the following additional guidance:
 - Temporary signs must conform to the regulations for permanent signs which includes having a reflectorised material when they are required to be read during the hours of darkness.
 - Signs should be in upper case white legend on a red background with a white border.
 - An x-height (height of lower case letter 'x') of 50mm would be suitable for traffic signs on 30mph roads, 75mm for 40mph, 100mm for 50mph, 150mm for 60mph and 200mm for 70mph. The overall size of the sign will vary according to the character height. Where the verge of footway width limits size, the next lower x-height increment may be used.
 - For safety reasons traffic signs should not contain telephone numbers, website addresses or email addresses as this may divert a driver's attention away from the road. Commercial names must not be used on the signs, however, government agencies or local highway authority names are compliant.
8. Further information on the use of temporary traffic signs can be accessed at:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-white-on-red-signs-at-road-works>
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-traffic-signs-for-special-events>.

Location of Signs

9. It is best practice to position outbreak signage on, or as close as possible to, the borders of the relevant control zones to advise road users that they are entering or leaving a control zone. Local authorities should always liaise with the APHA or use the interactive map to ensure their mapping systems accurately identify the most up-to-date control zones.

N.B. Defra's online interactive map service is only activated during outbreaks and can be accessed via the relevant disease homepage on the gov.uk website e.g. for avian influenza this would be <http://www.gov.uk/guidance/avian-influenza-bird-flu>.

10. Signs should as a minimum be deployed on all major roads (excluding motorways). It is acknowledged that it will not always be possible to place signage on every road or lane and local knowledge should be used to identify minor roads which may be used by keepers of the susceptible species involved e.g. access to feed mills, animal gatherings or slaughterhouses.

11. Best practice would include the provision of additional signs to provide drivers with advance notice that a control zone is approaching - the word "ahead" could be added to the sign in Annex 1. Practically this may not be possible in the initial days of a zone being declared, given the need to deploy road signage as rapidly as possible.

12. The Highways department of a local authority are normally tasked with deploying outbreak signage and should have their own guidance on this. If further information on the design and positioning of warning signs is required, this can be found in Chapter 4 of the Traffic Signs Manual <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/traffic-signs-manual>.

Removal / Review of Signs

13. The location of animal disease controls zones can quickly change, be merged or removed once disease spreads or when it is controlled or eliminated. It is important to conduct regular reviews to ensure outbreak signage accurately reflects the control zones. Changes should be made promptly to avoid misinformation.

Other Types of Outbreak Signage

14. **Footpaths** - Defra is responsible for making decisions relating to the closure or restricted access of public rights of way. It is unlikely that a policy decision would be made to close footpaths unless they run through an infected premises or adjacent to the boundary of a premises infected with either Foot and Mouth Disease, Swine Fever or Avian Influenza. The LAAHF should liaise with the APHA and their Rights of Way department on this matter. Annex 2 provides a suggested format

for footpath closure signs. These are normally printed on A4 paper, laminated, and attached to existing posts.

15. **Bridleways** – It may be necessary for APHA to warn against use of bridleways dependent on the type of disease (e.g. Equine Infectious Anaemia) and if a bridleway runs close to an infected premises. APHA may also ask the local authority to place such warning signs on bridlepaths or other public rights of way used by horse owners where they run close to an infected premises – see Annex 3. The same advice as footpaths applies.
16. **Infected or otherwise Restricted Premises** – APHA are responsible for serving restrictions on infected places (where livestock have tested positive for a disease) and the placement of restricted premises signs and warning tape. An example is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

This information has been redacted.

Appendix G: Croydon Resilience Forum

The Croydon Resilience Forum (CRF) is a statutory borough forum with the aim to co-ordinate, develop and implement an integrated approach to emergency response and management for the London borough of Croydon.

Activation

The DRO will notify the CRF of an animal disease outbreak in or in close proximity to the borough via email or through the resilience team's mass communication system Everbridge (Further information in the Communicating in an Incident Plan). A multi-agency teleconference may be convened to coordinate actions locally.

Core membership during an animal disease incident response

The following agencies may have a role to play locally during an animal disease outbreak (dependant on type of disease) however other agencies within the CRF may be involved if the need arises.

Agency	Responsibility
MPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist Croydon Council with the policing of Surveillance Zones and enforcement of movement controls. • Work in partnership with Croydon Council to consider local intelligence. • Managing any disturbances to the peace or obstruction to enforcement and veterinary activities.
Environment agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess the local environmental risk posed by the disease outbreak. • Work to minimise the environmental impact of the disease situation. • To notify, warn and advise relevant stakeholders on potential and actual environmental risks. • To issue relevant permits before waste management / disposal activities commence.
Public Health England	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide advice on protective measures to reduce the risk of disease in exposed people • Provide advice and information to persons who may have been exposed • Co-ordinate with local NHS partners on specific health arrangements for the incident.

Agency	Responsibility
NHS (including: Croydon Health Services NHS Trust, South London and Maudsley NHS Trust, Croydon Clinical Commissioning Group)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-ordinate with PHE on specific local health arrangements and risks for the incident.

CRF Animal Disease Agenda

Suggested agenda for first meeting

1) Situational Awareness:

- What has happened? (use METHANE)
- NDCC and LDCC teleconference feedback
- Reference to disease specific annex
- Locations affected
- Analysis of impact

2) Multi-agency considerations for supporting Croydon Council

- CofL involvement
- Cross-border implications
- Resources available

3) Horizon Scan

- What are the potential longer term implications?
- Do we need to set up a Recovery Coordination Group?

4) What do we need to have ready to report back on at next meeting?

5) Tempo of future meetings.

ANNEX 1 – ANIMAL DISEASE OUTBREAK TEMPORARY TRAFFIC SIGNS

This information has been redacted.

**ANNEX 2 – FOOTPATH CLOSURE
EXAMPLE SIGN**

This information has been redacted.

ANNEX 3 – WARNING NOTICE FOR BIRDLEPATHS AND OTHER RIGHTS OF WAY

This information has been redacted.