DESIGNING FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY

Supplementary Planning Document No. 3

CROYDON COUNCIL
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Introduction

In May 2006, the non-political think tank Reform published Urban Crime Rankings. This research was based upon information supplied by the Metropolitan Police Service and the Office for National Statistics. It ranked the London Borough of Croydon as the ninth safest London Borough (out of 33).

Croydon is one of the safer places to be in the capital.

However, the residents of Croydon suffer from a perceived fear of crime. The creation of anonymous spaces, inward looking buildings, large building set backs and secluded subways in some modern developments have not helped.

Architecture and planning cannot solve all problems of crime but there are proven approaches to design which are effective in the prevention and reduction of crime. This document concentrates on those specific design principles.

One major difficulty in designing out crime is the need to weigh up objectives of good design with the objectives of secure environments. They can sometimes create conflicting demands. While it is true to say that successful urban development will promote safety and security, an imbalanced scheme which over emphasises the need for security features can often appear unfriendly as well as ugly. A scheme which does not pay enough attention to issues of security will be more of an easy target than it otherwise should be.

In finding that balance, an understanding of the local context is important, every site is different and has to be considered individually. For example, in the north of the Borough the crime rate is higher, yet in the south the fear of crime is stronger (analysis conducted as part of Croydon's annual fear of crime survey). No development can satisfy all objectives to an equal extent which is why successful designs achieve an appropriate balance - one that responds to the needs of a site, as well as the needs of its users.

The Key Objectives

The key objectives of this document are:

1.   To identify crime related design issues that exist in Croydon and provide a set of Principles and guidelines to tackle them.

2.   To ensure that all new development is carried out in a sustainable way, minimising the opportunity for crime.

3.   To promote a better quality of life for all, free from crime and the fear of crime.

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Purpose of the Guidance

The context of this document exists at a number of levels, stemming from a variety of social and political factors. Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 describes the statutory duties that the council must fulfil.

At a national level, Safer Places, produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Office in 2004 encourages greater attention to the principles of crime prevention and to the attributes of safer places. This is a companion document to Planning Policy Statement 1, which sets out the importance of design in the planning process.

At a local level, this document coincides with the objectives of the Safer Croydon Partnership and Croydon's Sustainable Community Strategy. The former is the council's commitment to the creation of a safe environment for everyone who lives, visits and works in Croydon. The latter sets out priorities for the development of Croydon as an attractive place to live and work in. This includes reducing crime, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime.

The principles of Secured by Design have provided the framework for this document. Secured by Design (SbD) is an initiative created by the Association of Chief Police Officers and promoted at a local level by Police Officers known as Crime Prevention Design Advisers (CPDA). SbD aims to reduce crime by designing buildings and developments that provide fewer criminal opportunities. Where SbD certification is sought and where it is required information can be found on www.securedbydesign.com. CPDA officers have substantial knowledge and should be included early on in design discussions.

The guidance for "Designing for Community Safety" will be used in the assessment of planning applications by the Council. Proposals which do not, without good reason, embody the principles described are likely to be refused planning permission as conflicting with Policy UD6 of the revised UDP.

Designing for Community Safety needs to be considered at the beginning of the design process

How to use this Document

The SPD begins by emphasising seven guiding principles that cover most types of development.

The seven principles relevant to crime prevention are...

- **Natural Surveillance**

- **Access and Movement**

- **Activity**

- **Sense of Ownership**

- **Defensible Space**

- **Physical Protection**

- **Management and Maintenance**

The following section explores a variety of building types in greater detail.

At the back of the document is a checklist of key points to be considered in Designing for Community Safety at the beginning of the design process.

> **Like sustainability, designing for community safety needs to be considered at the beginning to achieve well designed buildings and places.**
> **It is also more economic to plan in security at the planning and design stage.**

1   Natural Surveillance

The usefulness of the edge as a support for people-watching is greatly increased by the provision of places to sit.

This row of houses pro-vides natural surveillance to the street and adequate defensible space in the form of a small front garden.

Routes with little overlooking are easy targets for vandals.

Cameras must take account of the context, as they can add to visual clutter in the street scene. Whilst they can give reassurance , the obvious presence of cameras can add to the perception that crime is present.

1.1 Definition

Natural surveillance is about the presence of people who have the potential to discourage anti-social behaviour. The idea that somebody is present, and possibly watching, is enough of a deterrent to stop most criminal behaviour. Natural surveillance is the most desirable and effortless design principle. It occurs on the street when people pass by, or from inside buildings or vehicles.

1.2 Design of Spaces

Spaces around buildings should be open to view from adjoining occupied properties. Front entrances should be clearly visible from the street. This, along with a combination of well used routes, assists in discouraging criminal activity through an increased risk of detection for potential offenders.

1.3 Illumination

In public places, increasing the uniformity of illumination reduces people's fear of crime. This is due to a greater level of visibility of the desired route being taken, as well as better visibility to the street from the surrounding environment. Security lighting should be designed to illuminate all external doors and vulnerable areas. It should be controlled by sensors or timers to turn off lights and it should be sensitively positioned to reduce glare and light pollution. Consideration should be given to energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy in selection of the type of lighting. Coordination with other street furniture and the location of trees and planting is important.
(*Refer to Supplementary Planning Guidance 4 on lighting).*

1.4 CCTV

Camera surveillance of public space can have a positive effect on reducing crime rates and boosting people's sense of security. Natural surveillance should be the primary aim, which can be augmented by the use of cameras. It is advisable to regularly evaluate the effectiveness of camera surveillance, as it is an expensive system to set up and manage. It can also create feelings of mutual distrust so care must be taken not to infringe upon privacy to an unacceptable degree. Where CCTV is specified, it should be designed simultaneously with a lighting scheme. This will aid the recognition of offenders, increasing the chance of conviction.

2 Access and Movement

The entrance to this shopping street is busy and inviting.

Although clear and direct, this street is intimidating, lacking both activity and overlooking.

Street clutter undermines natural surveillance and turns the pedestrian experience into an uncertain and uncomfortable one.

2.1 Definition
Busy movement routes heighten people's sense of safety by providing natural surveillance through pedestrian and vehicular activity. The creation of underused and lonely movement routes is to be avoided wherever possible. Routes should lead to somewhere people want to go.

2.2 Direct Routes
Clear and direct routes through an area for all forms of movement are desirable. This will ensure that all new routes are easy and convenient to use. Those which are designed with high quality materials and are well maintained are likely to feel safer, encouraging greater levels of use.

2.3 Choice of Routes
In public places people are more wary after dark. This is because levels of natural surveillance are reduced and there tend to be less people out and about, especially in winter. Therefore, it is important that a choice of routes exist. People will want to use a different route if their first choice appears threatening. The second choice of route should not be significantly longer.

2.4 Clear Routes
It is important for pedestrians to have good visibility along the route of the footpath. The visual obstruction caused by the thoughtless positioning of street objects should be kept to a minimum, and natural surveillance over the footpath maximised to provide views from adjacent buildings. The width of new footpaths should ensure that wheelchairs and pushchairs could pass each other easily without infringement of personal space.

2.5 Permeability
Through roads need to be well used and visually open. Cul-de-sacs should be shallow and short to allow ease of pedestrian use and provides passers by on the main street a chance to survey them. The location of short cul-de-sacs within perimeter block layouts can enhance community safety, by encouraging a sense of ownership as well as concentrating pedestrian activity where they join the main road.

3   Activity

A single-use-housing estate-potentially a lack of activity in daytime-attractive to burglary as the perception is that there is no one around and the criminal will be undetected.

3.1 Definition
Levels of activity appropriate to a location can generate a sense of safety and provide natural surveillance. Where there is too much or too little activity however, this can lead to the criminal feeling sufficiently anonymous to act.

3.2 Variety of Uses
A single use can lead to places feeling deserted, making them attractive to criminals who perceive they are less likely to be detected. A mix of compatible uses in a place or building increases activity at different times facilitating natural surveillance and making places feel safer.

Successful natural surveillance, but the presence of many people can risk anonymity; encouraging crime and anti social behaviour.

4   Sense of Ownership

Outdoor activities which attract groups of people promote a collective identity which can foster feelings of community and ownership.

Small outdoor spaces needn't be turned into parking spaces. This courtyard in Copenhagen is now a play area with seating.

This is a good example of residents taking ownership of their street and using it for children's play.

4.1 Definition
When people view public space as their own, they begin to take responsibility for it. Places can be designed to foster a sense of ownership, mutual protection and belonging.

4.2 Responsibility
It is vitally important that ownerships and responsibilities for external space are clearly identified: what is public, what is private, what is semi-private? This understanding can lead to a sense of ownership of a particular place and increases the likelihood that external spaces will be cared for and maintained in the long term. This also provides the sense felt by residents that a building or space is for their use and discourages outsiders.

4.3 Activity
In public places which are deemed unsafe, if people can be encouraged to use the place by creating a sense of ownership, then people's perceptions of their own safety within that space will improve. This is one of the greatest reasons for investing in a high quality, well-designed environment.

4.4 Sociable Places
Social and recreational needs of communities must be encouraged where opportunities exist for their sustained use. The provision of meeting places, both indoors and outdoors, strengthen community relations by providing positive alternatives, especially for young people. Sports facilities are obvious examples, especially if they encourage team building.

4.5 Perception of Space
Changes in surface material at the entrance to a development, a street or courtyard, can give the sense that the space beyond is different, and care must be taken when entering the space.

Markets signify a strong community however gathering places can sometimes be a focus of anti-social behaviour. This is often the case where there are few figures of authority to challenge disruptive behaviour. Successful gathering places are self-policing.

The open space in front of these flats does not feel like it belongs to the residents.

4.6 Design Sensitivity

Designing over protective environments is counter - productive when trying to foster a sense of collective well being. A 'fortress' appearance can imply the area is unsafe and heighten people's fear of crime. It is almost always visually intrusive and therefore detrimental to the environment.

4.7 Community Consultation

It can be beneficial to consult local communities at the initial planning stage and during the design process. They have invaluable knowledge on the characteristics of their local area, and can positively advise on any proposed changes to their area. This consultation can also encourage community support and a sense of ownership.

5   Defensible Space

Traditional forms of defensible space. Spaces between buildings and streets should not be so deep so as to affect natural surveillance.

Defensible space needn't be in the form of a physical barrier. This example in Copenhagen demonstrates informal spill out space.

Spill-out space is a useful way of adding vitality and natural surveillance to the public realm.

5.1 Definition
Defensible space is the space over which users of nearby buildings are able to maintain effective levels of supervision and control. While types of defensible space may differ between locations, the principle remains the same.

5.2 Buffer Zones
One type of defensible space is a small buffer zone that sits between a publicly accessible space and a building's edge. For example, the small front garden immediately in front of a Victorian property could be classed as defensible space. In separating the activities that go on inside a building to those that would occur outside, the level of user comfort and feelings of safety within the building are heightened. Areas of high pedestrian activity and high levels of noise and smell from traffic would be instances where the provision of defensible space may be appropriate. Where patio and French doors open onto communal space, in part of a development that is accessible from the street, an area of defensible space should be allocated to deter entry by the use of planting and, or railings or fencing.

5.3 Spill Out Space
Areas of defensible space are often ideal places for residents to take ownership and customise as alternatives to formally enclosed gardens. However, care must be taken over the real and perceived ownership of the rest of the external space.

5.4 Restricting Access
For most buildings, it is often the back which is more vulnerable to burglary. This is because it faces away from the public street and is more hidden from view. It is worth considering restricting public movement to these areas (where they are not public rights of way). Lockable gates can secure alleyways at the rear of older terraced properties, which may have been vulnerable to crime.

6   Physical Protection

Boundary fencing providing physical protection should be Attractive.

Street furniture can be attractive AND provide physical protection.

6.1 Definition
Well designed security features, considered necessary for physical protection should be incorporated in the original design. Where extra elements of physical protection are required after the place or building is constructed, care should be taken to avoid creating a negative visual impact. Added barbed wire, grills and steel palisade fencing can increase the fear of crime, suggesting the area is unsafe.

6.2 Boundaries
The design and selection of materials for boundaries should be sensitive to their context and the potential visual and physical impact on the local environment. The need for natural surveillance, defensible space, sense of ownership, activity, access and physical protection should all be considered in the selection of boundary type.
(Refer to Section 8 .2.4and 9.6 on boundaries for housing and open space.)

6.3 Building materials and elements
Enhanced security features for windows and doors that comply with BS7950: 1997, and PAS23/24-1: 1999 are recommended.
(For more detailed advice refer to Safer Places ODPM, Secured By Design and the local Crime Prevention Design Advisers, contact details in Appendix C.)

7   Management and Maintenance

7.1 Definition
The future management and maintenance should be considered at the outset in the design as it can discourage criminal action and damage.
(Refer to Section 4.2 and 4.5 – Sense of Ownership).

Signs of disorder and vandalism encourage crime and should be removed as soon as possible. A regime of removal sends a message that crime is not tolerated.

An example of public realm producing a safe and attractive place to live.

7.2 Resources
It is crucial to consider the allocation of sufficient resources for maintenance at the outset to ensure that the design can be effectively maintained and the message that crime is not tolerated is implied by a well kept appearance. Security systems need to be adequately resourced to ensure in future years that it they are effectively monitored and maintained and that the installation expenditure is not wasted-
e.g. an unmonitored CCTV system is ineffective in crime detection. It can increase the risk of crime where an over reliance on CCTV in the development leads to the omission of some, or all of the principles of designing for community safety.

7.3 Design Quality and Detail
The use of high quality materials selected for robustness and appearance, along with sustainability and an appropriate maintenance regime will increase the attractiveness, and encourage the use of streets, places and buildings. Increased usage promotes the perception of safety. Raising the quality of the public realm and the standard of maintenance can encourage greater respect towards the environment.

7.4 Community, Resident and Business Management
In promotion of the interests of local businesses and the town centre, management partnerships can encourage good urban design to create attractive and vibrant places. The formation of neighbourhood groups such as "Neighbourhood Watch" can help to instil a sense of ownership and responsibility.

7.5 The Impact Of Time On Design.
The maintenance regime and the future growth of planting needs to be considered at the design stage in conjunction with the design and maintenance of signs, lighting and CCTV to avoid conflicts, e.g. planting having to be severely pruned or removed in the future for visibility of lights, signs and, or cameras.

Design Guidance

8 Housing

These guidelines are intended for the design of new developments as well as the refurbishment of existing premises.

In all types of housing, increasing the number of ground floor openings, windows and doors maximises natural surveillance. This surveillance is increased when the windows are of active rooms such as living rooms. Bedrooms are unlikely to provide occupiers with regular daytime surveillance opportunities. They are also less likely to be a deterrent to the opportunist with criminal intent. Consideration should be given to the location of particular uses, with the aim of maximising natural surveillance where possible.

The residents of this housing block in Sweden benefit from a secure internal courtyard. Access to it is completely unrestricted as the space is protected by natural surveillance and activity.

8.1 APARTMENTS

8.1.1 Variety of Dwellings
In large housing developments there should be a mix of dwellings through a variety of tenures, sizes and densities to provide for different social groups. The potential for homes to be occupied throughout the day gives increased opportunities for natural surveillance around the clock. The presence of commercial uses that support large housing schemes, such as a shop or laundrette creates activity and gives rise to more natural surveillance.

8.1.2 Social Facilities
The provision of well used and well maintained social facilities within high density development can provide great benefits for local residents. Strong community ties can be formed through, for example, the sharing of common facilities such as sporting and recreational facilities; children's play areas and social spaces such as communal lounges, external seating areas or roof gardens. Such facilities should be located to give natural surveillance of entrances, lobbies and external areas.

In this UK example, the security of the development has been reinforced by restricting access into the grounds. This should be a last resort as it increases the fear of crime by suggesting the area is unsafe.

8.1.3 Anonymity
Where large numbers of people share a common entrance and people find it increasingly difficult to recognise each other, a concierge system can make residents feel more secure in their homes.

8.1.4 Location of Entrances
Entrances to apartment blocks should not be situated within an under croft area.

8.1.5 Internal Finishes
Internal finishes in circulation areas such as doors or lifts should be designed to be robust but attractive. Low cost, low quality materials may encourage residents to test their strength.

8.1.6 Entry Control
An access control system will be necessary to gain entry into habitable areas, ideally with the employment of a concierge. A door entry phone system is an alternative option. Visual audio entry systems are recommended in developments over eight households.

8.1.7 Storage Areas
Refuse stores and cycle storage areas that are designed within the building envelope must not permit unauthorised access into the development and also need to be subject to natural surveillance.

8.1.8 Fire Safety
Care needs to be taken to ensure that security measures do not conflict with fire regulations with regard to means of escape. If in doubt, consultation with the Council's Building Control Office is advised.

8.1.9 Alterations to Existing Developments
Where it is felt to have a considerable effect in increasing residents' safety, security can be enhanced by restricting access into certain areas. This may involve ensuring access ways to a development cannot be used as through routes by other users. The provision of defensible space to ground floor homes may also help.

8.1.10 Design Sensitivity
The delicate integration of all new elements into the wider urban fabric is important for the long term success of a development. Any changes at a large scale need to be designed sensitively. High quality materials and fittings such as light columns should be specified consistently throughout the redevelopment.

The Cromer Street area in Camden has been used as a case study in the ODPM's Safer Places document.

This is a good example of housing renewal. External space has been enclosed and a playground Provided.

The route through the development is open in the day and closes at night. This ensures a consistent level of activity in the day.

Gated developments can have a negative impact on establishing a sense of community and natural surveillance in the locality.

8.2 HOUSES

8.2.1 Unobstructed Views
Front doors, porches and garages should not obscure the line of sight from windows. Development should ensure as many unobstructed views as possible. Bay windows are better than flush windows providing wider views of the street.

8.2.2 Active Frontages
Windowless elevations and blank walls adjacent to publicly accessible spaces should be avoided. Blank walls, found regularly on the ends of terraces often attract graffiti and are convenient places to dump rubbish.

8.2.3 Level Changes
Front rooms allow good surveillance of the street while maintaining privacy. Level changes can be used to this advantage where front rooms are above street level. The building design must adhere to Building Regulations.
(*Refer to Supplementary Planning Guidance 10 on Designing for Accessibility*).

8.2.4 Boundary Walls
Boundary walls on the street front should be low to provide for street surveillance. At the rear of properties, boundary walls should provide for greater privacy and secure enclosure. Rear gardens or private communal gardens should back onto other secure private land or buildings. Physical barriers and gates must not be easy to climb or remove from their hinges.
(Refer to Section 6- Physical Protection)

8.2.5 Sheltered Accommodation
Sheltered housing should not be isolated. It should be sufficiently close to other housing to optimise natural surveillance, yet sensitive to the needs of the elderly and the vulnerable, and compatible with other uses.

8.2.6 Access Controls
Care must also be taken in the design of the outside areas of the building to avoid creating easy access to upper floors of buildings. This should be designed in, without having to resort to anti-climb paint, barbed wire or other added on elements.

New residential development should provide a continuous building line with frequent entrances and windows. This allows for increased opportunities for surveillance and activity.

Corner houses are preferable to end terraces, providing better natural surveillance.

8.3 EXTERNAL AREAS

8.3.1 Amenity Space
The provision of public open amenity space as an integral part of new residential developments should make a valuable contribution towards the quality of the development and the character of the neighbourhood. To be successful it needs to be designed to suit its intended purpose, and be appropriately located.

There is no overlooking of this space. Residents have found a convenient place to dump rubbish where it can remain unseen.

8.3.2 Landscape Design
The planting of trees and shrubs has a beneficial environmental impact and can soften harsh urban areas and so reduce the fear of crime. Planting should be designed to allow for natural surveillance. Consideration should be given to the use of lower growing plants next to footways and cycle ways, particularly in areas of high crime to avoid the possibility of hiding places.
(*Refer to Supplementary Planning Guidance 12 on Landscape Design for further detail*).

In addition to fencing, the use of planting can define site boundaries.

8.3.3 Lighting Design
This should ensure that the needs of pedestrians are considered as a priority. The location of lights should take into account the shadows from buildings and landscape elements. It should also consider the eventual height and breadth of trees and bushes. All lighting should be energy efficient.

8.3.4 Car and Cycle Parking Design
All parking should be well lit with a clear and direct access to the building. There should be no hiding places within a car park and all areas should be overlooked by passing pedestrians and, or, occupied buildings. Cycle parking should be overlooked, preferably sheltered and lockable, with robust anchorage for the bicycle at two chassis points.
(*For more detailed advice on parking refer to Safer Parking -more details in Appendix B).*

Although this space is overlooked, it is physically isolated from the houses. By the time residents can reach the garages, any vandals will have gone.

8.3.5 Flexible Parking Arrangements
A balance needs to be struck between the needs of car ownership with the desire for safe and pleasant streets. The visual impact, noise and movement generated by large areas of parking must be mitigated. Parking arrangements have to be flexible and must be integrated in the design process.

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8.3.6 Control of Parking
Indiscriminate parking onto residential amenity space should be controlled. The design and location of planting or other features is often enough of a physical barrier to deter unwanted intrusion and to encourage a sense of ownership and defensible space.

Planting to protect a blank wall.

8.4 Refurbishments
Working within the constraints of an existing layout and structure can bring complex design challenges. Flexibility is an important factor in the design of refurbished properties and the integration of security features. Should any conflict arise between the statutory requirements associated with works to Listed Buildings and in Conservation Areas the requirements of enhanced security, priority should be given to the statutory provisions.

8.5 Building Security
Robust door and window frames, locks and glass can reduce the risk of burglary and vandalism. Quick repairs are important, as wilful damage may continue. Enhanced security fixtures that comply with B.S. 7950: 1997 and PAS 23/24-1:1999, are recommended.
(*For more detailed advice on building security refer to Secured by Design).*

Textured surfaces, intended to disrupt the overt impression of the paint is one way of tackling graffiti. In this example trellis was added but only worked as a deterrent to graffiti where there was planting too.

8.5.1 Resisting Graffiti
Graffiti can be discouraged in a number of ways. Along with providing blatant overlooking or defensible space, the size of the blank wall can be broken up or reduced to discourage graffiti. As a reactive measure, an anti-graffiti coating can ease removal. The graffiti must be removed promptly to maintain a sense of care for the environment and if a coating is applied to mask the graffiti it should be sympathetic to the appearance of the building.
*(Refer to Section 7 on Management and Maintena*nce).

No graffiti has been applied to the rough stone wall.

9   Open Space and Play Areas

The provision of open spaces and children's play areas are important elements of the built environment but, unless carefully located and designed with the children in mind, can be misused and become a focus for anti-social behaviour. A lack of play facilities may also be a cause for anti-social behaviour.

Open spaces should serve a purpose and be attractive to everyone or they risk becoming 'no go' areas .

9.1 Use
Designs, future management and maintenance must be carefully considered in respect of how spaces are likely to be used. It is important to ensure that open spaces serve a function and can be enjoyed in a natural and uninhibited way.

9.2 Open Space for All
Provision for all ages should be considered in the planning and design of open spaces, if an age group is ignored this can lead to alienation and anti-social behaviour. As an example, allotments can be vital places, integrating community interests.

This urban park in Brussels has visibility below the tree canopy for users to feel comfortable and be seen by others.

9.3 Natural Surveillance
Parks and playgrounds can benefit from having a level of overlooking from surrounding buildings, public roads and footpaths. Play areas for very young children should be located close to the dwellings they are intended to serve to encourage regular use and thus informal surveillance by the accompanying carers.

9.4 Clear Layout
Feelings of apprehension and insecurity increase when users do not have an understanding of the lay-out of the area they are in. Signs should be used as part of a comprehensive sign strategy for the area, as used indiscriminately they can become street clutter and create visual confusion.

Public open spaces cannot survive without regular maintenance.

9.5 Paths
Designers should try to anticipate preferred routes through open areas. These invariably follow the shortest route. The result of unrecognised desire lines are improvised footpaths that occur in unexpected places, thus undermining the planning and security of the space.

9.6 Boundaries

If open space is to be valued and used by the community it must feel safe and secure with clearly defined boundaries that deter access from unwanted intrusions such as motorcycles.
(Refer to Section 6 on Physical Protection)

9.7 Materials

The degree of robustness of selected materials should be appropriate to the proposed locations and use(s). For example, materials that can be easily removed, should be avoided in public places to minimise opportunities for vandalism and other forms of anti-social behaviour.

9.8 Maintenance

Maintenance of open space must be adequately resourced. For large areas, an on-site caretaker is beneficial, providing both a presence to users and a responsive service in maintaining the area.

Children's play areas should be well maintained and have some natural surveillance, like this one in Rotterdam. Local residents can take pride in using it.

10 Schools and Community Centres

Ashburton Learning Village combines a learning environment for adults as well as children.

Victorian schools are synonymous with their integration into the street scene.

Schools should not have to rely on excessive security measures.

A good school design should instil a sense of pride in the community for teachers and attending students without having to rely on overtly visible security measures.

10.1 Siting and Natural Surveillance
School buildings need to be part of the street scene and visible from public areas. Houses that overlook school grounds may provide informal surveillance. The school building design should be compact, avoiding recesses where offenders cannot be seen. The building design should be easy for an on-site resident caretaker to provide a degree of supervision and surveillance.

10.2 Access
Pupil security can be achieved by having a single point of entry into the school building and a central reception, with similar provision for after hours access.

10.3 Security Measures
Fencing can be designed to be secure whilst avoiding the fortress type appearance which can deter a sense of ownership and community. It should not be possible to climb onto the roof of a school building.

10.4 Management
Schools should have neat, well lit, well-maintained buildings and grounds with direct paths and legible sign posting. Routes to public transport and parking areas should be well lit and visible from surrounding buildings.

10.5 Community Relations
Local communities should be encouraged to become involved in the activities of their local schools. Communal parts of the buildings can be used after school hours, encouraging a sense of ownership, activity and natural surveillance.

11 Commercial and Non-Residential

Concentrated pedestrian flows provide eyes onto the street.

The ground floor of this office has no windows or doors. It is an attractive opportunity for vandals.

A mix of appropriate uses should be provided within commercial centres to attract a range of users, in terms of gender, age, mobility and incomes and at all times of the day and evening. This can include residential, with an outlook over the public street, above shops and offices to encourage activity and natural surveillance. Pedestrians can provide effective eyes looking onto the street and an attractive and well designed town centre is likely to draw people in.

11.1 Design of Ground Floors
Active frontages for commercial buildings should be encouraged at ground floor level. Pedestrian access should be direct from the road to the front of the building. Retail units should avoid deep recesses on shop fronts that may attract loitering and provide hiding places. Quick repairs to doors and windows are important, or wilful damage may continue.

11.2 Shop Front Security
Solid shutters to shop fronts create a fortress-like appearance and their installation can give an area a dead appearance, providing a surface for graffiti and restricting night time illumination from shops.
 (*Refer to Supplementary Planning Guidance No. 1, Addenda 1 on Shop Front Security for further detail*).

11.3 Crime Prevention Systems
Ideally in the business environment, such as shopping areas, crime prevention systems should complement and be able to communicate with the local authority systems to facilitate the exchange of information and effectiveness of systems in apprehending criminals.

11.4. STREET FURNITURE
Street furniture and tree planting can be designed to enhance the street scene, and be positioned to prevent ram raiding

11.4.1.Automatic Teller Machines (ATM)s
ATMs should be installed only where they front onto main streets so that users are not isolated. Poorly lit areas or those in shadow should be avoided. Placement of street furniture near ATMs should be carefully considered to avoid providing vantage points such as seating. Reflective surfaces around the ATM will allow the user to see who is around them as they use the machine.

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11.5 PUBLIC TRANSPORT

It is necessary for public transport interchanges to be both legible and visible. Where pedestrians need to cross roads or railways, generous, open routes above ground are preferable to subways.

11.6 INTERNAL CAR PARKS

Car parks should be brightly lit, using natural light from stairwells and entrances, and should avoid dark recesses. It should be easy to find your way round with the use of navigable features such as prominent signage or the colour coding of walls or floors. Some parking should be close to and directly accessible from main entrances for those working late.

(*For more detailed advice on car parking refer to Safer Parking - more details in Appendix B).*

11.6.1 Car Park Surveillance

Large expanses of car park should be avoided. Active windows of adjacent properties should overlook the car parks. Access points should be controlled, and help points should be available. CCTV linked to a control room could be provided where car parks are considered vulnerable to crime. Security patrols can provide additional benefits.

ATM 'phone booths' should be sensitively located where they will not be the focus of vandalism and where people can be seen using them. Care should be taken to avoid them becoming another piece of street clutter.

Public transport stops and stations should be well lit, regularly maintained, adequately overlooked and have clear direct routes to exits and parking areas.

11.7 OUT OF TOWN DEVELOPMENTS

These types of buildings are characterised by their scale, remoteness and lack of continuous occupation. Measures to mitigate this increased vulnerability, such as physical protection, should be designed to enhance the local environment.

11.7.1 Active Frontages

Building frontages should face public streets and be visible to users and those passing by. Service areas should ideally be overlooked by adjacent properties in a back to back fashion. Areas of material storage, including rubbish should not be physically or visually obtrusive.

11.7.2 Variety of Uses

The introduction of compatible uses into an area increases activity at different times, enabling more consistent levels of natural surveillance.

11.7.3 Illumination

Routes should be well lit and vulnerable areas should receive greater attention, for example, the lighting of entrances and loading bays. Parking areas should be overlooked by adjacent buildings and illuminated at night.
(*Refer to Natural Surveillance , para1.3*)

11.7.4 Responsibility

The distinction between public and private space needs to be emphasised with a regular maintenance regime to establish a sense of ownership.
(*Refer to Section 4, Sense of Ownership*).

11.8 PLANNING FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS

Terrorist attacks have become a distinct possibility in recent years. In the event of a terrorist attack in Croydon, the specification of glazing in buildings is perhaps the most significant consideration in the design. Most casualties of terrorist bombs are the result of flying glass. It is recommended where major development is proposed, that a Counter Terrorism Security Advisor is referred to during the design stage.
(Refer to MI5 booklet Protecting Against Terrorism, available from the Home Office website and Appendix C for contact details for further advice).

This attractive and well maintained shopping precinct draws people in.

Appendices

A Glossary

Active Frontage: The frontage or edge of a building or space that has windows and doors as opposed to blank walls, fences and garages.

Alleygating: Installing gates to close the back alleys between terraces of houses as a means of deterring crime.

Fortress Mentality: A way of thinking that leads to excessive efforts to make a building or place resistant to crime or anti-social behaviour.

Home Zone: A small, highly traffic-calmed, residential area, often with road and pavement integrated into a single surface, where pedestrians and cyclists have priority over cars.

Legibility: The degree to which a place can be easily understood and traversed.

Mixed Use: A mix of complementary uses within a building, on a site or within a particular area. Places which have a mix of uses are likely to be lively at different times for different reasons, as different people use or pass through them.

Natural Surveillance: The discouragement to wrong-doing by the presence of passers-by or the ability of people to see out of windows.

Permeability: The degree to which an area has a variety of routes through it.

Semi-private Space: Space that may be privately owned or managed but into which the members of the public may enter if they have a legitimate reason, such as a front garden.

Semi-public Space: Space that is publicly accessible but has management practices to inhibit some activities and encourage others, such as shopping centres.

Spill-out Space: Open space used in association with an adjacent building, tables and chairs on the pavement outside a café, for example.

Target Hardening: Modifying a building to reduce opportunities for committing crime.

Territoriality: Expressing a sense of belonging to a particular place. The sense felt by residents that a building or space is theirs.

Source: All terms taken from the Dictionary of Urbanism

B Resources and Further Reading

Government Guidance:
Safer Places, 2004, ODPM; By Design, DETR
Secured By Design, the Association of Chief Police Officers,
(www.securedbydesign.com).

Good Practice Guidance:
Car Parking - What Works Where, English Partnerships
Decent Parks Decent Behaviour, CABE Space
Preventing Anti-social Behaviour in Public Spaces, CABE Space
Urban Design Compendium, English Partnerships
What are We Scared of? The Value of Risk in Designing Public Space, CABE
Space

Police Guidance:
Secured by Design; Safer Parking (www.britishparking.co.uk); The Alleygater's
Guide to Gating Alleys

Lighting Guidance:
Lighting and Crime, Institution of Lighting Engineers
Lighting the Environment – A Guide to Good Urban Lighting, Chartered Institute of
Building Services Engineers
Lighten Our Darkness – Lighting Our Cities, Royal Fine Arts Commission

Published Research:
No Particular Place to Go? Groundwork UK
Personal Security Issues in Pedestrian Journeys, DETR
Urban Crime Rankings May 2006, Blair Gibbs, Andrew Haldenby (Reform)

Relevant Publications:
A Pattern Language, C Alexander
Design Out Crime – Creating Safe and Sustainable Communities, I Colquhoun
Home Zones – A Planning and Design Handbook, M Biddulph
Image of the City, K Lynch
Life Between Buildings: Using Public Space, J Gehl
Responsive Environments, I Bentley, et al.
Shaping Neighbourhoods, H Barton, et al.
The Community Planning Handbook, N Wates
The Death and Life of Great American Cities, J Jacobs
The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces, W Whyte

C Contacts List

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D Relevant Council Policies and Strategies

Supplementary Planning Documents

Shopfront Security SPG No.1 addenda 1
Residential Extension SPD No.2
Lighting (Interim SPG No. 4)
Nature Conservation SPG No. 5
Designing for Accessibility SPG No.10
Landscape Design SPG No 12
Renewable Energy SPG No. 15
Sustainable Surface Water Usage SPG No 17
Sustainable Water Usage SPG No. 18

Strategies and policies:-

Croydon Replacement Unitary Development Plan (UDP). Adopted July 2006
Safer Croydon Partnership Crime Reduction Strategy 2006-2009
Safer Croydon Crime Reduction Audit Summary
Croydon's Sustainable Community Strategy 2006-9
Croydon's Housing Strategy 2006-10

E Checklist of Design Principles

In preparing designs for development including refurbishment the following should be considered: -

1. Natural Surveillance

• Have all opportunities for natural surveillance have been maximised and at all times of the day, week, and year?

• Are routes and public spaces overlooked?

• Are cycle parks overlooked and close to entrances?

• Are parked cars visible from active windows?

• Are service areas overlooked by adjacent properties?

• In major developments and mixed use schemes are communal facilities located to give natural surveillance of lobbies and external areas?

• Is the lighting design sensitive to its environment and sustainable yet effective in crime prevention?

• Are covered/underground/internal car parks well lit?

• In considering the need for natural surveillance has the design taken into account the future growth of planting?

• Have blank walls and frontages been designed `out` of the scheme to avoid lack of surveillance, activity, `dumping area` and graffiti walls? Where part of a refurbishment scheme can blank walls be fitted with` non climbable` trellis and planting to deter graffiti?

• Has CCTV been considered where natural surveillance is not possible and cannot be encouraged?

• Is CCTV the best solution to solve the particular problem?

• Will there be resources to maintain the CCTV system, including staff to monitor it in future years?

2.   Access and Movement

- Are proposed routes likely to be busy? Are they clear and direct? Do they lead somewhere?

- Have routes been designed with high quality materials that are straightforward to maintain?

- Does a choice of routes exist? Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?

- Has street furniture been positioned to minimise clutter and to avoid conflict such as seats next to ATMs, CCTV next to trees etc?

- Have street objects been placed so as not to obstruct the visibility of routes?

3.   Activity

- Has a mix of compatible uses been considered?

- Have potential conflicts been addressed?

- Is anonymity discouraged? If not, should additional surveillance be considered such as CCTV?

- Is the object/activity that attracts people to the place sustainable and enduring?

- Have all opportunities for active frontages been maximised?

- Is the night time use considered and if so, is it diverse and inclusive?

- Is there provision for play/activity for all ages in the design of open space and play areas?

- Are areas of storage and temporary debris screened from the main public view to maintain an attractive frontage and to avoid encouraging dumping and vandalism? (An attractive public realm attracts people).

4.   Sense of Ownership

- Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space clearly defined and will this be clear to all users?

- Are boundaries defined in an appropriate way, a physical or implied barrier, such as changes in paving?

- Have opportunities for sustainable planting to soften the urban environment, to create defensible space and a sense of ownership been utilised?

- Are boundaries of a high quality in design in their detailing and appropriate to the locality?

- Have the social and recreational needs of communities been considered?

- Has amenity space been defined to suit its purpose? What is its purpose?

- Have local residents been consulted on development schemes?

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5. Defensible Space

- Is defensible space needed?

- Has there been a proven problem such as physical intrusion, trespassing, vandalism, graffiti, which defensible space could solve?

- With the inclusion of defensible space, is it still possible to observe the street from the front of the property?

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6. Physical Protection

- Has the Crime Prevention Adviser been referred to for advice?

- Has the development incorporated security measures and principles appropriate to the local area and context?

- Are boundaries for schools and communal facilities secure but avoiding a 'fortress-like' appearance i.e. welcoming the community rather than intimidating and alienating?

- Has the need for security and privacy to the rear of properties been considered along with the need for natural surveillance to the front?

- Has the building design considered security and ensured that the building cannot be climbed and easy access to floors is avoided?

- Do windows comply with BS 7950: 1997, and doors to PAS23/24-1: 1999?

- Has a visual audio entry system been provided for development of over eight households?

- Have the advantages of crime measures been weighed against their adverse impacts?

- Has the potentially negative visual impact of crime measures been ameliorated by good design?

- For major developments as defined in the Croydon Replacement Unitary Development Plan (UDP) has the Counter Terrorism Security Advisor been referred to?

7. Management and Maintenance

- Has a management and maintenance plan been considered as a major contribution to the quality and sustainability of design?

- Are users, residents, community and businesses involved in the management?

- Has the design layout and management plans considered the coordination of the location and maintenance of signs, lights, CCTV and planting?

- Are appropriate facilities management and surveillance systems in place such as Crime Prevention Systems and CCTV?

- Is the maintenance regime sending out a message that crime will not be tolerated?

Please note...

Designing for community safety needs to be considered at the beginning to achieve well designed buildings and places.